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Abstract
This paper investigates how overlapping ownership a¤ects quality levels, consumer surplus, rms
prots and welfare when the industry is a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly and quality choice
is endogenous. This issue is particularly relevant since recent empirical evidence suggests that
overlapping ownership constitutes an important feature of a multitude of vertically di¤erentiated
industries. We show that overlapping ownership while detrimental for welfare, may increase or
decrease the quality gap, consumer surplus and rmsprots. In particular, when the overlapping
ownership structure is such that the high quality rm places a positive weight on the low quality
rms prots, the incentives of the high quality rm to compete aggressively reduce. This may
increase the equilibrium quality of the low quality rm, which in turn may lead to higher consumer
surplus, despite higher prices.
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1 Introduction
Overlapping ownership - in the form of cross-ownership by competitors (internal shareholders) or
common ownership by (external) shareholders - can induce managers to internalize the externalities
they impose on rival rms (Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983; Rotemberg, 1984; Gordon, 1990; Hansen
and Lott, 1996). This internalization can naturally lessen product market competition since it
reduces the incentive of rms with ownership links to compete aggressively, leading (i) to higher
product prices and lower output levels (Bresnahan and Salop, 1986; Reynolds and Snapp, 1986;
Flath, 1992; Dietzenbacher, Smid and Volkerink, 2000; Shelegia and Spiegel, 2012; Brito, Ribeiro
and Vasconcelos, 2019a);1 and (ii) to a lower likelihood of entry (Newham, Seldeslachts and Banal-
Estanol, 2018). However, this internalization can also have a bright side by (i) promoting cost-
reducing investments (Shelegia and Spiegel, 2015; Antón et al., 2018; López and Vives, 2019);
(ii) facilitating the transfer of tacit knowledge and product innovation (Ghosh and Morita, 2017;
Papadopoulos, Petrakis and Skartados, 2019); and (iii) reducing intra-industry portfolio risks (Shy
and Stenbacka, 2019).
We contribute to this strand of the literature by studying the e¤ects of overlapping ownership on
the quality choices, consumer surplus, prots and welfare of a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly. This
issue is particularly relevant since recent empirical evidence suggests that overlapping ownership
constitutes an important feature of a multitude of vertically di¤erentiated industries. See, for
example, Schmalz (2018), Newham, Seldeslachts and Banal-Estanol (2018) and Backus, Conlon and
Sinkinson (2019) for evidence on the airline, banking, supermarket and pharmaceutical industries.2 ;3
We show that when the overlapping ownership structure is such that the high quality rm places a
positive weight on the low quality rms prots, the incentives of the high quality rm to compete
aggressively reduce. This may increase the equilibrium quality of the low quality rm, which in
turn may lead to higher consumer surplus, despite higher prices.
The model, the equilibria and the conclusions are presented in sections 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
1Brito, Ribeiro and Vasconcelos (2019a) show that overlapping ownership can induce product prices and output
levels that are even higher and lower, respectively, than those in a monopoly.
2For a characterization of the importance of overlapping ownership in those industries please see Tables 2, 3 and
4 in Schmalz (2018), Table 1 in Newham, Seldeslachts and Banal-Estanol (2018) and Figure 12 in Backus, Conlon
and Sinkinson (2019).
3We can identify features of an airline such as bag handling, gate location, connecting layover times, ight
schedules, in-ight services, legroom, seat characteristics, and ight frequency with the quality of an airline (Barbot,
2004; Brueckner and Flores-Fillol, 2019). We can identify the probability of failure of a bank with the quality of the
bank (Vives, 2016). We can identify features of a supermarket such as product assortment, store location, product
availability, car parking space, and opening hours with the quality of a supermarket (Aslan, 2019). We can identify
the brand name of a pharmaceutical product (even though generics are legislated to be therapeutically identical to
branded products) with the perceived quality of the product (Cabrales, 2003).
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All proofs are presented in the mathematical appendix.
2 Theoretical Model
We follow Wauthy (1996)s approach and notation. Two duopolists, rm 1 and rm 2, sell products
of di¤erent quality to a continuum of consumers that have di¤erent valuations for quality. We assume
that each consumer is identied by a parameter  that characterizes the utility when purchasing
from rm i = L;H, as follows: ui = si pi, where si and pi denote the quality and price of rm i.
 is uniformly distributed over the support [ ; +], and +=  is assumed to be su¢ ciently large so
that the market is not covered in equilibrium. We focus on the non-trivial case in which sH > sL,
with sH and sL denoting the quality level of the high (H) and low (L) quality rm, respectively.
The utility of not purchasing any product (outside option i = 0) is normalized to zero: u0 = 0.4
We assume that quality is costless and can take values in interval [0; s+] in the lines of Choi
and Shin (1992) and Wauthy (1996). This simplies the analysis considerably. Assuming xed or
variable costs of quality as in Motta (1993) makes the model intractable and it is no longer possible
to solve explicitly for the equilibrium quality levels. This constitutes a very interesting potential
area for future research.
We also assume that, due to overlapping ownership, rm is objective function places a weight
wi < 1 on rm js prot (with the weight on own prot normalized to 1). These assumptions imply
that the objective function of rm i = L;H is bi = i + wij = piDi + wipjDj , where i and Di
denote the prot and demand of rm i.5
3 Game, Timing and Equilibrium
Consumers and rms play the following game. At the beginning, nature draws the valuations of
each consumer for quality. Next, rms address a two-stage decision problem. In the rst (second)
stage, each rm chooses the quality (price) of its product. Finally, each consumer selects the option
(i = H;L; 0) that provides the highest utility. We focus on the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium
(SPNE) of the game and begin by addressing the consumers decision problem.
4 If, alternatively, the market was fully covered, the outcome would be maximum di¤erentiation, regardless of the
ownership structure and prices would increase in the presence of overlapping ownership.
5We are agnostic about whether overlapping ownership is induced by common-ownership, cross-ownership or both
and about which particular type of weight is used. See Brito et al. (2018) for a review of the implications of each type
of ownership on the objective function of rms. See Backus, Conlon and Sinkinson (2019) and Brito et al. (2019b)
for a discussion of di¤erent alternative weights.
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3.1 Consumers Decision Problem
It is straightforward to show that consumers with (i)   HL = pH pLsH sL will purchase the high
quality product; (ii) pLsL = L0   < HL =
pH pL
sH sL will purchase the low quality product; and (iii)
 < L0 =
pL
sL


















3.2 Firms Decision Problem
The SPNE of the game involving the rmsdecision problem is obtained by backward induction.
In the second stage, the two rms (simultaneously) set the prices that maximize their objective
function given the quality levels. Lemma 1 presents the corresponding equilibrium.









Given the quality levels sH and sL, both equilibrium prices increase in wL and wH . The fact
that each rm places a positive weight on the rivals prot makes them price less aggressively. The
price di¤erence pH   pL increases with wH and decreases with wL because own equilibrium price is
more a¤ected by an increase in the weight given to the rival than the rivals price.
Having addressed the equilibrium in the pricing stage, we now address the quality stage. The
two rms (simultaneously) set quality levels anticipating the price equilibrium above. Lemma 2
presents the corresponding equilibrium.6







Corollary 1 For any (wL; wH) 2 (0; 1)2, sH is invariant to wH and wL, while sL is increasing in
wH and decreasing in wL.







In order to discuss the implications of Corollary 1 on consumer surplus, rmsprots and welfare,
we begin (for tractability) by analyzing some particular cases before addressing the general case.
3.2.1 Benchmark Case: wL = wH = 0














This yields, as in Choi and Shin (1992) and Wauthy (1996), that the lower quality rm chooses
quality and price levels which are 4=7 and 2=7, respectively, of those of the higher quality rm. As a
consequence, HL = 512
+ and L0 = 18
+, which yields that DH = 7
+
12(+  ) and DL =
7+
24(+  ) .
In turn, consumer surplus is CS = 7s
++2
24(+  ) and, since costs are zero, rmsprots are H =
7s++2
48(+  ) and L =
s++2
48(+  ) , which implies that welfare is W =
11s++2
24(+  ) .
3.2.2 Case 1: wH > 0 and wL = 0
In this case, the overlapping ownership structure is such that only the high quality rm places a














This yields, as established by Corollary 1, that the high quality rm chooses the same equilibrium
quality (and price) as in the benchmark case while the low quality rm has an incentive to increase
its equilibrium quality (and price) and narrow the quality gap. The reason being that the high
quality rm will now price less aggressively (given it internalizes the externality imposed on the
rival), which makes the demand of the low quality rm more sensitive to its quality level.7 As a
consequence, HL increases while L0 remains unchanged: HL =
5 wH
12 4wH 
+ and L0 = 18
+, which
7 In the benchmark case, the choice of quality level by the low quality rm is the result of two countervailing
e¤ects. The rst (direct) e¤ect induces the rm to increase its quality level since higher quality increases demand.
The second (strategic e¤ect) induces the rm to decrease its quality level since higher quality leads the rival (the
high quality rm) to lower its price, which in turn decreases demand for the rm. In case 1, overlapping ownership
increases the rst e¤ect (since it makes the demand of the low quality rm more sensitive to its quality level, as the
high quality rm will price less aggressively) and may increase or decrease the second e¤ect (since it can make the
price of the high quality rm more or less sensitive to the quality level of the low quality rm, depending on the
quality levels). The impact on the rst e¤ect dominates and so the quality level of the low quality rm, increases.
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Figure 1
Demand Impacts in Case 1
yields that some demand will now be diverted from the high quality rm to the low quality rm,
as depicted in Figure 1. Proposition 1 discusses the impact on consumer surplus, rms prots and
welfare.
Proposition 1 If wL = 0:
(a) Consumer surplus increases with wH ;
(b) The high (low) quality rms prot decreases (increases) with wH ;
(c) Welfare decreases with wH :
We begin by addressing the impact on consumer surplus. It is striking it may increase when there
is overlapping ownership and competition is less intense. The reason is as follows. When comparing
the equilibrium decisions when wH = 0 with those when wH > 0 one can divide consumers into
four distinct groups, as depicted in Figure 1. Consumers with  < 18
+ and   5 wH12 4wH 
+ are
una¤ected by the change in wH . The former do not make any surplus while the latter make the
same surplus because sH and pH do not change with wH . Consumers with 18




+   < 5 wH12 4wH 
+, on the other hand, benet from the change in wH . The former now pay a
higher price, but are more than compensated by the higher quality, while the latter now purchase
a lower quality, but are more than compensated by the lower price.
We now address the impact on rmsprots. The prot of the high quality rm decreases with
wH because some demand is diverted from the high quality rm to the low quality rm while pH
does not change. The high quality rm accepts this loss in prot since it now places a positive
weight on the prot of the low quality rm, which increases with wH because some demand is
diverted from the high quality rm to the low quality rm while pL increases.
Finally, we address the impact on welfare. Despite the positive impact on consumers, welfare
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decreases with wH as the result of the following trade-o¤ (since price is irrelevant in terms of
welfare). On the one hand, some consumers continue to buy the low quality product, whose quality
increases with wH . On the other hand, some consumers switch from the high quality product to the
low quality one. The second e¤ect, which is felt by consumers with a higher valuation for quality,
dominates.
3.2.3 Case 2: wH = 0 and wL > 0
In this case, the overlapping ownership structure is such that only the low quality rm places a














This yields, as established by Corollary 1, that the high quality rm chooses the same equilibrium
quality (and a higher price) while the low quality rm has an incentive to decrease its equilibrium
quality (and increase price for wL < 0:25605/decrease price for wL > 0:25605), widening the quality
gap. The reason being that such lower quality level benets the high quality rm, which is now







+, which yields that the demand decreases for the two rms, as depicted in
Figure 2. Panel A depicts the case (labeled 2a) in which the new (increased) L0 is lower than
5
12
+ (i.e., when 0 < wL < 0:70901) while Panel B depicts the case (labeled 2b) in which the new
(increased) L0 is greater than 512
+ (i.e., when wL > 0:70901 > 0). Proposition 2 discusses the
impact on consumer surplus, rms prots and welfare.
Proposition 2 If wH = 0:
(a) Consumer surplus decreases with wL;
(b) The high (low) quality rms prot increases (can either increase or decrease) with wL;
(c) Welfare decreases with wL.
We begin by addressing the impact on consumer surplus. Now, when comparing the equilibrium
decisions when wL = 0 with those when wL > 0 one can divide consumers into ve distinct groups,
8 In case 2, overlapping ownership may increase or decrease the two e¤ects discussed in footnote 7 (since it can
make the demand of the low quality rm and the price of the high quality rm more or less sensitive to the quality
level of the low quality rm, depending on the quality levels). Moreover, it introduces a third (direct) e¤ect, which -
dominates and - induces the low quality rm to decrease its quality level, since a lower quality increases the demand
for the high quality rm, now internalized by the low quality rm. The high quality rm responds to this increased
demand by increasing its price.
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Figure 2
Panel A: Demand Impacts in Case 2a
Panel B: Demand Impacts in Case 2b
as depicted in Figure 2. Consumers with  < 18
+ are una¤ected by the change in wL since
they do not make any surplus. All the remaining consumers are, on the other hand, hurt by the
change in wL. Consumers with 18




+ (in case 2a or with 18
+   < 512
+
and 512




+ in case 2b) are hurt because they make a surplus purchasing from





+   < 512
+ and 512








+   <
5 w2L
12 4wL 
+ in case 2b) are hurt because now purchase a lower quality but are not compensated price-




+ are hurt because
now purchase the same quality at a higher price.
We now address the impact on rms prots. The prot of the high quality rm increases
with wL since the decrease in sL allows the rm to increase pH , which more than compensates the
resulting decrease in demand. The prot of the low quality rm may increase or decrease with wL
because demand decreases (the diversion to the outside option more than compensates the diversion
8
from the high quality rm) while pL may increase or decrease.
Finally, we address the impact on welfare. Welfare decreases with wL because (since price is
irrelevant in terms of welfare) some consumers switch from the low quality product to the outside
option, some consumers continue to buy the low quality product, whose quality decreases, and some
consumers switch from the high quality product to the low quality one.
3.2.4 Case 3: wH = wL = w
In this case, both rms place a positive and symmetric weight on the rival prot, which combines














This yields that the high quality rm chooses the same equilibrium quality (and a higher price)
while the low quality rm has an incentive to decrease its equilibrium quality (and increase price for
w < 0:569 86/decrease price for w > 0:569 86). This, in turn, suggests that the dominating e¤ect
when both rms places a positive and symmetric weight on the rival prot is the one resulting from
wL, which is, in fact, established in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If wH = wL = w:
(a) Consumer surplus decreases with w;
(b) The high (low) quality rms prot increases (can either increase or decrease) with w;
(c) Welfare decreases with w:
3.2.5 General Case
The cases above illustrate that overlapping ownership (a) may increase or decrease consumer surplus
(in particular, it decreases consumer surplus if wL is signicantly di¤erent from zero);9 (b) may
increase or decrease rmsprots; and (c) decreases welfare.




In this paper, we have analyzed the implications of overlapping ownership in a standard vertical
di¤erentiation duopoly model. We have shown that overlapping ownership while detrimental for
welfare, may increase or decrease the quality gap, consumer surplus and rmsprots. In particular,
when overlapping ownership leads the manager of the high quality rm to place some weight on the
low quality rms prots, the low quality level increases and consumers will benet from this. The
reason being that when the rival prices less aggressively, quality di¤erentiation is not as relevant
and the low quality rm narrows the quality gap.
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Mathematical Appendix
In this mathematical appendix, we present the proofs of the results presented in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1







































from where the result follows directly.
Proof of Lemma 2
Plugging the equilibrium prices into the objective functions of the two rms results in:
bH(sH ; sL) = 1+   sH (sH   sL) 4sH sLwH(wL+1)2(4sH sL(wL+1)(wH+1))2

+2
bL(sH ; sL) = 1+   sH (sH   sL) 4sHwL sL(wL+1)(wL+2wHwL 1)(4sH sL(wL+1)(wH+1))2

+2:




4sH (wL   1)2 + sL (wL + 1) ( 2w2HwL (wL + 1) + wH (10wL   3w2L + 1)  w2L + 4wL   7)
(+    ) (4sH   sL (wL + 1) (wH + 1))3
= 0;
from where we obtain the low quality rms best response function:
sL(sH) =
4 (1  wL)2
(wL + 1) (2w2HwL (wL + 1)  wH (10wL   3w2L + 1) + w2L   4wL + 7)
sH :
We now show that the second-order condition for an interior maximum for rm L always holds:




2s2H (wL + 1)
2 f(sH ; sL)
(4sH   sL (wL + 1) (wH + 1))4
;
with:








 3w2L + 10wL + 1

+ w2L   4wL + 7

:
Note that f(sH ; sL) > f(sL; sL) = sL (3  wL   wH (wL + 1)) ( 2w2HwL   wH (3wL   1) + 5  wL). The rst two terms are
positive and the minimum of the last term is 0, obtained when wL = wH = 1. Thus, f(sH ; sL) > 0 and the second-order
conditions always hold.
With respect to rm H, the derivative is:
@ (bL(sH ; sL))
@sH
=
16s3H   12s2HsL (wL + 1) (wH + 1) + 2sHs2L (wL + 1)
 
wH (w2L + 3) + w
2
H (wL + 1)
2 + 4

  s3LwH (wL + 1)3 (wH + 1)
(+    ) (4sH   sL (wL + 1) (wH + 1))3
:
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Evaluated at sL(sH) this derivative is:
(1  wHwL) (3  wH   wL   wHwL)2








which is positive if g(wH ; wL) > 0, with:
g(wH ; wL) =  4w3Hw2L (wL + 1)2   4w2HwL (wL + 1)
 








L   9w4L + 2w5L + 3

  w5L + 6w4L   14w3L + 12w2L   wL + 14:
In order to see that, in fact, g(wH ; wL) > 0 note that:
@g(wH ; wL)
@wH
=  12w2Hw2L (wL + 1)2 + 8wHwL (wL + 1)
 








L   9w4L + 2w5L + 3

This is an inverted parabola with two roots above 1. So, for any wH 2 (0; 1) it is always negative, meaning that g(wH ; wL) always
decreases with wH . The minimum is then obtained when wH = 1 and takes value g(1; wL) = (2wL + 3w2L + 11) (1  wL)3 > 0.
As a result, the high quality rm will always want to set the highest admissible quality.
Proof of Corollary 1




4 (1  wL)2 ( w2L (4wH + 3)  wL (4wH   10) + 1)
(wL + 1) (w2H2wL (wL + 1)  wH (10wL   3w2L + 1)  4wL + w2L + 7)
2
:
The denominator is always positive and the second term in the numerator is an inverted parabola with a minimum when wL = 0


































Proof of Proposition 1
Given the equilibrium price and quality expressions one can easily compute consumer surplus, rmsprots and welfare, which







































Proof of Proposition 2
Given the equilibrium price and quality expressions one can easily compute consumer surplus, rmsprots and welfare, which
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are presented below divided by s++2:






















































































Proof of Proposition 3
Given the equilibrium price and quality expressions one can easily compute both rmsprots, consumer surplus CS and welfare








































Consumer Surplus in the General Case
Consumer surplus CS in the general case is given by:





















L (wL + 1)
2   12w2HwL (wL + 1)2 + wH (38wL   14w2L + 24w3L   11w4L + 2w5L + 9)




( 4wL + w2L + 7) (3wL   4w2L + w3L   4)










L (wL + 1)
2   2w2HwL (wL + 1) (14wL   7w2L + 2w3L + 3)




wHwL (36wL   50w2L + 28w3L   5w4L + 39)  (56wL   80w2L + 54w3L   17w4L + 2w5L + 1)




The sign of this derivative is given by the inverse of the sign of:




L (wL + 1)
2   2w2HwL (wL + 1)
 
















L (wL + 1)
2   4wHwL (wL + 1)
 
































> 0. As such, for any wL, h(wH ; wL) increases with wH , meaning that for wH < 1, it is smaller than:
h(1; wL) =  
 
26wL   11w2L + 1

(1  wL)3 < 0
This implies that h(wH ; wL) < 0 and, as such, that @CS@wH
> 0. We can now evaluate CS at wH = 1, the highest possible level
























85 < wL < 1, constitutes a su¢ cient condition for consumer
surplus to decrease with overlapping ownership.
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